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Abstract
Ancient Greek philosophers claimed that the particular task of art was mimesis. This kind 
of view about the relation between art and the world was dominant until the beginning of 
the 19th century. The theory of genius rethought this relation, and it did not presume that 
art needs to mirror the world. On the contrary, it expected originality, that is, the creation of 
a new world. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the artworld operates under a wider 
notion of the ‘work of art’, e.g. Duchamp’s “readymade” and “institutional readymade”, 
which are linked to outsider art. In both cases, the creation of an object and the creation of 
an art piece are separate actions performed by different individuals. This paper attempts 
to tackle these problems and prove that the contemporary art does not relate primarily to 
the world, but mainly to the artworld. Thus, the path from art to the world goes through the 
artworld.
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Art as a mirror
“Art	as	the	mirror	of	reality”	is	a	very	common	cliché	about	art.	The	persist-
ence	 of	 this	 cliché	 is	mainly	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Renaissance	 actually	
regarded	painting	as	a	mirror.
“We	are,	however,	building	a	new	an	art	of	painting	about	which	nothing,	as	I	see	it,	has	been	
written	in	this	age	(…).”;1
was	claimed	by	Leon	Battista	Alberti	during	the	Renaissance,	and	this	was	the	
common	conception	of	painting.	Since	painting	was	the	leading	art	form	of	
the	era,	the	mirror-metaphor	was	also	applied	to	other	forms	of	art.	The	basis	
of	the	mirror-theory	can	be	found	in	Aristotle’s	mimesis-theory,	which	is	the	
central	 idea	 in	his	Poetics.	 In	 this	work	about	poetry	with	a	special	 regard	
to	tragedy,	the	Greek	author	established	at	the	start	of	the	second	paragraph	
that
“…	epic	poetry	and	the	poiesis	of	tragedy,	and	further	comedy	and	the	art	of	making	dithyrambs,	
and	most	of	the	art	of	the	flute	and	of	the	cithara	are	all	in	general	imitations.”2
There	 are	 significant	 similarities	 between	 the	 mirror-theory	 and	 mimesis	
(both	refer	to	“replicas”,	as	in	being	ontologically	secondary	to	their	object:	
1
Leon	Battista	Alberti,	On Painting,	Yale	Uni-
versity	Press,	New	Haven	1970,	p.	64.
2
Aristotle,	On Poetics, St.	Augustine’s	Press,	
South	Bend	–	Indiana	2002,	p.	2.
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mirroring	presumes	an	external,	first	order	being	that	has	the	ability	to	have	a	
reflection,	but	this	ability	is	incidental	and	contingent,	while	imitation	relates	
to	 its	 relevant	 first	order	object),	however,	we	can	observe	a	slight	shift	 in	
emphasis	between	the	two.	For	Aristotle,	imitation	concerns	mainly	dynamic	
arts:	tragedy	“imitates	those	acting”3	and	music	imitates	emotions.	Before	we	
jump	to	the	conclusion	that	mimesis	can	only	imitate	actions	but	not	objects,	
let	us	consider	the	paragraph	in	which	Aristotle	mentions	the	characteristics	
of	mimesis	and	where	he	states	that
“…	we	take	pleasure	in	contemplating	the	most	precisely	made	images	of	things	which	in	them-
selves	we	see	with	pain,	for	example,	the	visible	shapes	both	of	the	least	estimable	of	beasts	
and	of	corpses.”4
In	the	same	paragraph,	Aristotle	reveals	that,	in	his	view,	mimesis	also	means	
the	imitation	of	the	scene,	similarly	to	Plato.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	not	inci-
dental	that	Aristotle	was	preoccupied	with	questions	about	tragedy	in	the	4th	
century	BC,	and	Alberti	decided	to	investigate	painting	in	the	15th	century,	as	
both	thinkers	wanted	to	untangle	the	strings	that	made	up	the	most	prominent	
art	form	of	their	era.
The	mirror-metaphor	 is	not	Alberti’s	genuine	 idea,	actually,	 it’s	not	even	a	
Renaissance	 invention.	We	 can	 encounter	 the	mirror-painting	metaphor	 in	
Plato	when	he	attempted	to	ridicule	our	infatuation	with	painting	and	sculp-
ture.	 Socrates	 presented	 the	 “painter”	with	 his	 trademark	 irony:	 “What	 an	
extraordinary	man!	(…)	He	must	be	a	wizard	and	no	mistake	(…)”;5	because	
he	 can	 create	 anything.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Socrates	 proved	 to	 us	 that	 the	
knowledge	of	 the	painter	does	not	amount	 to	anything	extraordinary,	 since	
anyone	could	do	the	same	thing,	even	the	amazed	naïve	Glaucon:
“…	an	easy	way	enough;	or	rather,	there	are	many	ways	in	which	the	feat	might	be	quickly	and	
easily	accomplished,	none	quicker	than	that	of	turning	a	mirror	round	and	round.”6
While	Plato	used	the	mirror-metaphor	for	mockery,	and	drew	our	attention	to	
the	fact	that	all	artistic	creations	“would	be	appearances	only”,7	the	mirror-
metaphor	in	the	Renaissance	embodies	the	credo	of	representational	painting:	
“painting	strives	to	represent	things	seen”;8	and	even	though	painting	is	only	
concerned	with	the	surface	of	its	object,	according	to	Leonardo	da	Vinci,9	it	
still	captures	its	first	truth.	This	brings	us	to	a	different	self-conception	of	art:	
art	is	meant	to	represent	nature	in	the	most	realistic	way,	as	if	we	were	look-
ing	at	nature	in	a	mirror.	The	appeal	to	nature	is	a	genuinely	new	approach	
in	which	the	visible	world,	nature	as	an	environment,	becomes	a	value	on	its	
own	which	does	not	merely	fulfil	the	role	of	a	transmitter	towards	God,	true	
existence	or	the	Realm	of	Ideas.	The	world	that	is	represented	in	paintings	is	
not	the	transcendent	world,	but	our	world.	Our	world	is	worthy	of	representa-
tion	on	its	own.
The	imagery	of	nature	appears	in	this	age.	Until	the	Renaissance,	and	even	in	
the	early	Renaissance,	nature	(trees,	rocks,	rivers)	was	represented	in	order	to	
direct	attention	to	the	central	figures.	It	was	an	aid	in	reconstructing	the	story	of	
the	picture	and	constructing	the	ambiance	(e.g.	Giotto’s	St. Francis Preaching 
to the Birds	or	The Lamentation).	For	Leonardo,	on	the	other	hand,	portrayals	
of	nature	have	an	aesthetic	role.	Given	that	painters	were	only	beginning	to	
recognize	beauty	in	nature,	they	strived	to	produce	“replicas”	that	resembled	
nature	as	thoroughly	as	possible:	the	“reflections”	had	to	be	completely	free	
from	any	type	of	distortions	or	differences.	They	developed	drawing	grids,	
the	linear	and	aerial	perspective,	 they	took	risks	by	performing	banned	au-
topsies	in	secret	in	order	to	provide	a	deeper	insight	into	the	human	anatomy	
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and	make	the	portrayal	of	body	ever	more	accurate.	The	results	achieved	by	
the	Renaissance,	in	respect	to	the	techniques	of	figurative	representation,	are	
spectacular	and	quite	hard	to	surpass,	and	are	also	the	reason	why	realistic	
representation	began	to	rule	the	artworld	for	the	following	500	years.
The	 idea	of	“art	as	a	mirror”	was	strengthened	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that,	by	 the	
middle	of	the	18th	century,	the	concept	of	art	was	crystallized	and	it	was	es-
tablished	as	the	imitation	of	nature.	In	a	famous	1746	writing	Les Beaux-Arts 
réduits à un même principe, Charles	Batteux	did	not	discriminate	between	
different	art	forms	that	were	considered	to	be	separate	disciplines	up	to	that	
point	(poetry,	painting,	sculpture,	music,	and	dance),	and	he	declared	that
“…	nature	is	the	sole	object	of	all	the	arts”,10
and	 that	 all	 arts	merely	 imitate	nature	 in	 their	 specific	ways.	Batteux	goes	
even	further	and	states	that
“…	art	is	only	perfect	when	it	reflects	nature	perfectly,	and	masterpieces	are	the	ones	that	repre-
sent	nature	so	well,	that	we	might	mistake	them	for	nature	itself.”11
Denis	Diderot,	who	–	as	a	notable	polyhistor	–	studied	the	art	of	painting	and	
valued	art	inspired	by	nature	and	real	life	above	the	mannerism	of	academic	
painting,	expressed	a	similar	view	in	1766.	Diderot	took	Batteux’s	view	a	step	
further:	his	predecessor	expected	the	imitation	of	nature	to	include	an	ideal-
izing	motion,	that	the	artist	depicts	nature	as	it	is	supposed	to	be.	Diderot,	on	
the	other	hand,	thought	that	the	painter	does	not	have	any	other	role	but	to	
observe	nature	and	copy	it	precisely,	“plus	l’imitation	serrait	parfaite	et	ana-
logue	aux	causes,	plus	nous	on	serrions	satisfaits”,	since	“la	nature	ne	fait	rien	
d’incorrect”,	thus	we	do	not	have	any	reason	to	correct	nature.12	The	painter’s	
only	job	is	to	create	a	reflection	of	nature.
Before	the	19th	century,	the	dominant	view	was	that	art	is	meant	to	represent	
world,	more	particularly	to	represent	nature,	and	the	more	a	product	resem-
bles	reality,	the	more	valuable	it	is.	This	entailed	a	great	over-appreciation	of	
the	skills,	techniques	and	knowledge	necessary	for	the	precise	representation	
of	reality.	Artists	were	not	supposed	to	represent	reality	in	their	own	unique	
way,	but	were	 supposed	 to	be	precise	and	 reflect	nature	 the	best	way	 they	
could.	This	approach	was	put	aside	in	the	19th	century	for	numerous	reasons.	
First	of	all,	the	genius-theory	appeared,	leading	to	a	new	perspective	accord-
3
Ibid.,	p.	4.
4
Ibid.,	p.	8.
5
Plato,	The Republic,	Pennsylvania	State	Uni-
versity	Press,	Hazleton	(n.	d.),	p.	269.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.,	p.	270.
8
L.	B.	Alberti,	On Painting,	p.	67.
9
See	 Leonardo	 da	 Vinci,	Notebooks,	 Oxford	
University	Press,	Oxford	2008.
10
See	Charles	Batteux,	Les Beaux-Arts réduits à 
un même principe, Chez	Durand,	Paris	1746,	
p.	7.	[Translated	by	G.	H.]
11
Ibid.,	p.	17.
12
“…	 the	 more	 imitation	 will	 be	 perfect	 and	
analogue	to	 the	causes,	 the	more	we	will	be	
content	(…)	the	nature	does	not	make	incor-
rect	things.”	See	Denis	Diderot,	“Essai	sur	la	
peinture”,	in:	Oeuvres complètes de Diderot. 
Tome Dixième,	Garnier	fréres,	Libraires-édi-
teurs,	Paris	1966,	p.	462.	[Translated	by	G.	
H.]
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ing	to	which	the	most	important	task	of	the	genius	was	not	to	copy	everything	
in	a	sedulous	manner,	but	 to	strive	for	originality.13	Secondly,	 romanticism	
discovered	emotion,	and	 it	believed	 that	 the	 task	of	 the	artist	 is	 to	express	
and	to	arouse	emotions	in	the	audience.	Finally,	due	to	technology,	a	“mirror”	
much	more	precise	than	any	painting	in	the	world	was	created,	and	that	mir-
rot	is	photography.	A	photograph	is	not	only	able	to	reflect	reality	perfectly,	
but	it	can	also	“freeze”	the	reflection,	which	would	otherwise	be	gone	within	
seconds.	Prima facie,	art	has	lost	its	legitimacy	as	a	mirror	of	reality.
Genius, as demiourgos
“To	create	a	work	of	art	is	to	create	the	world.”
Wassily	Kandinsky
In	the	19th	century,	the	general	view	about	art	and	the	role	of	the	artist	changed,	
and	the	shift	can	be	traced	to	Immanuel	Kant’s	Critique of the Power of Judg-
ment.	In	this	work	from	1790,	Kant	did	not	only	establish	grounds	for	the	au-
tonomous	aesthetics	in	philosophy,	but	also	constructed	the	theoretical	basis	
for	artistic	autonomy.	The	central	idea	in	this	new	perspective	is	that	there	is	
no	concept	of	beauty:	searching	for	the	beauty	criteria	or	for	the	rules	of	fine	
arts	would	be	in	vain	since	these	do	not	exist.	No	precise	and	concrete	crite-
rion	exists	that	could	be	applied	to	particular	instances,	thus	the	fine	arts	can-
not	rely	on	rationally	deducible	and	applicable	rules.	If	this	is	true,	the	role	of	
the	artist	is	not	to	use	skills,	knowledge	or	techniques	as	beauty	does	not	fall	
into	any	of	these	categories.	Since	artists	cannot	follow	any	formula,	they	do	
not	really	have	any	other	choice	but	to	be	original.	Kant	concludes	that	“fine	
arts	are	the	art	of	the	genius”	and	that	the	most	important	characteristic	of	a	
genius	is	originality,	and	furthermore,	“everyone	agrees	that	genius	is	entirely	
opposed	to	the	spirit	of	imitation”.14
A	radical	shift	can	be	identified	in	the	way	the	role	of	the	artist	was	perceived:	
while	 initially	manual	 skills	 and	 dexterity	were	 the	most	 highly	 appraised	
talents	of	the	artist,	they	have	lost	most	of	their	value	by	the	standards	of	that	
era.	The	artist	is	a	genius	because	she	is	original:	she	can	create	a	new	reality	
without	following	a	pattern,	and	has	the	power	to	create	new	rules	for	art,	a	
power	very	similar	to	those	of	nature.	The	artist	takes	the	place	of	nature	in	
art:	in	this	genuinely	new	world,	created	by	the	artist,	the	artist	is	nature.	From	
that	point	on,	the	creation	of	the	perfect	double	is	not	the	task	of	art	anymore:	
the	artistic	creation	 is	a	new	world	with	 its	own	inner	 laws	and	principles,	
logic	and	sense.	The	world	created	by	art	is	the	realm	of	fantasy	and	imagina-
tion,	where	the	subjectivity	of	the	artist	objectifies	dreams	and	values,	where	
emotions	materialize	and	gain	voice	or	form.
As	the	roots	of	the	mirror-theory	can	be	found	in	ancient	Greece	in	the	idea	
of	mimesis,	the	genius-theory	also	has	Greek	roots.	Timothy	Gould	found	the	
roots	of	the	genius	concept	in	five	Greek	terms:15
mantiké	–	a	state	of	being	possessed	by	something	divine	and	immortal
enthousiasmos	–	the	indwelling	of	a	god
tekhné	–	art,	craft	or	skill
daimon	–	a	guardian	spirit
demiourgos	–	maker	or	craftsman
Indeed,	the	prefiguration	in	the	creation	by	the	genius	can	be	linked	to	Demi-
urge	from	Plato’s	works:	she	is	the	one	who	creates	the	world	following	the	
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model	of	the	Ideas.	The	difference	lies	in	the	fact	that	the	ancient	Ideas	were	
eternal	things,	thus	they	would	exist	prior	to	the	creation	of	the	world.	The	
genius	artist	does	not	have	this	luxury:	the	role	of	the	original	artist	is	to	cre-
ate	from	nothing.	The	special	state	which	makes	creation	possible	is	called	
inspiration,	and	it	has	its	own	ancient	roots.	Plato	explained	artistic	creation	
as	a	divine	possession	(mantiké).16	Tekhné	is	one	of	the	central	concepts	from	
Gould’s	list,	although	it	has	lost	a	lot	of	its	relevance,	and	it	plays	a	signifi-
cantly	smaller	role	in	the	evaluation	of	the	artist.	In	this	respect,	the	attitude	
of	the	Greeks	is	also	unclear.	Plato	emphasizes	that	the	poet	does	not	have	
expertise,	but	creates	 the	object	 in	 the	state	of	some	sort	of	divine	posses-
sion.	This	state	is	so	unique	that	it	cannot	be	reached	by	anybody,	it	cannot	
be	learned,	rationally	reproduced	or	controlled.	We	can	spot	a	resemblance	
with	the	state	of	the	modern	genius.	The	difference,	yet	again,	is	that	the	gen-
ius	does	not	draw	her	ideas	from	any	higher	source	–	she	does	not	transmit	
messages	from	gods,	rather,	she	creates	a	new	world.	An	element	persisting	
from	the	Greek	roots	is	the	Demiurge,	who	creates	a	new	world	in	the	state	
of	enthusiasm.
The	perspective	changes	at	the	beginning	of	the	19th	century.	In	the	modern	
episteme,17	temporality,	and	especially	historicity	played	a	crucial	role.	Thus	
the	19th	century	realizes	that	the	new	world,	created	by	the	artist,	is	not	only	
natural,	but	can	also	be	social.	Around	the	middle	of	the	19th	century	the	ar-
tistic	avant-garde	was	born.
‘Avant-garde’	is	a	military	term	meaning	the	‘advance	guard’	or	‘vanguard’:	
a	small	military	group	whose	job	is	to	seek	out	the	enemy	and	clear	out	the	
way	for	the	rest	of	the	troops.	In	a	metaphorical	way,	the	term	‘avant-garde’	
was	first	used	in	1825	by	Olinde	Rodrigues,	a	follower	of	Saint	Simon,	who	
claimed	 that	artists	were	 the	vanguard	of	 social	change.	They	are	 the	ones	
who	discover	uncharted	territories	for	the	rest	of	society.	Why	would	the	task	
fall	 on	 the	 artists?	Because	mapping	 the	 future	 presumes	 imagination	 and	
creativity,	which	are	 the	 typical	properties	of	 the	specialists	of	 imagination	
–	the	artists.
As	an	avant-garde	artist,	a	genius	basically	maps	our	shared	possible	worlds	
and	she	foresees	the	future	of	our	shared	reality.	This	is	nothing	other	than	a	
political	engagement,	which	gets	in	conflict	with	the	modern	idea	of	the	in-
dependent	artist.	The	avant-garde	artist	seeks	the	conception	of	a	new	world;	
she	envisions	a	new	society	while	stressing	the	importance	of	her	own	role	
in	the	process	–	“la	distinction”,	as	Bourdieu	quite	aptly	puts	it.18	The	avant-
garde	artist’s	search	for	the	conception	of	the	new	world	is	closely	related	to	
denying	everything	that	is	bourgeois,	philistine,	or	ordinary.	The	clash	of	the	
13
See	 Immanuel	 Kant,	Critique of the Power 
of Judgment,	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	
Cambridge	2000.	doi:	http://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511804656.
14
Ibid.,	p.	187.
15
See	 Timothy	 Gould,	 “Genius:	 Conceptual	
and	Historical	Overview”,	in:	Michael	Kelly	
(ed.), Encyclopedia of Aesthetics,	vol.	II,	Ox-
ford	 University	 Press,	 New	York	 –	 Oxford	
1998,	pp.	287–292.
16
See	Plato,	Ion,	The	Project	Gutenberg	EBook	
2008,	available	at:	http://www.gutenberg.org/
files/1635/1635-h/1635-h.htm	 (accessed	 on	
December	2,	2014).
17
See	Michel	Foucault,	Les mots et les choses. 
Archéologie des sciences humaines, Galli-
mard,	Paris	1966.
18
See	Pierre	Bourdieu,	La distinction:	Critique 
sociale du jugement,	Les	Editions	de	Minuit,	
Paris	1979.
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two	types	of	modern	(social	modernity	and	artistic	modernism)19	takes	place	
in	the	19th	century.
The	avant-garde,	with	its	need	to	highlight	its	own	originality,	creativity	and	
determination	for	experimentation,	is	probably	the	purest	instantiation	of	the	
concept	of	the	genius.	At	the	same	time,	it	also	bears	the	self-destructive	traits	
of	the	concept:	the	avant-garde	artist	is	so	eager	to	find	the	extraordinary	that	
her	hunt	for	distinction	drives	a	bigger	and	bigger	wedge	between	her	and	the	
potential	receivers	–	the	audience.	Art	becomes	more	and	more	exclusive,	and	
we	can	not	only	find	the	l’art pour l’art,	but	also	the	l’art pour l’artiste.	Art-
ists	begin	to	communicate	solely	among	each	other	and	their	peers	are	their	
only	audience,	because	only	they	can	understand	each	other	and	the	spectators	
are	getting	more	and	more	closed	off.	The	original	role	of	the	avant-garde	is	
not	fulfilled	anymore:	it	is	quite	hard	to	imagine	a	vanguard	that	intentionally	
leaves	the	legion.	We	probably	should	not	refer	to	it	as	a	vanguard,	it	is	closer	
to	being	a	villain	or	a	traitor.
If	all	this	is	true,	we	need	to	re-evaluate	the	role	of	the	genius-artist	and	the	
creation	of	a	new	world.	The	endeavour	is	valuable	if	it	is	for	the	good	of	our	
new,	shared	world	–	if	all	that	an	artist	does	is	create	a	world	that	can	only	be	
entered	with	a	VIP	pass,	the	legitimacy	of	her	originality	becomes	question-
able.
Ideation,	 a	 task	 specifically	 reserved	 for	 the	 artist,	 as	 Olinde	 Rodrigues	
thought,	is	getting	ever	more	appropriated	by	scientists	in	the	20th	century.	It	
was	obvious	to	Kant	that	only	the	artist	can	be	a	genius	–	all	that	a	scientist	
does	is	apply	algorithms	and	follow	a	rational	line	of	thought,	two	skills	that	
could	be	mastered	by	anyone.	There	is	no	possibility	for	creation	in	science	
because	 everything	 is	 already	 empirically	 coded,	 and	 all	we	 have	 to	 do	 is	
bring	it	forward	and	make	explicit	the	things	that	are	already	implicitly	in	our	
minds.	In	the	20th	century	the	situation	turned	over:	today,	when	we	think	of	
the	word	‘genius’,	the	first	person	that	comes	to	our	mind	is	Einstein,	who	
was	a	scientist	and	not	an	artist.	The	architects	of	the	new	world	are	not	artists,	
but	scientists.	Art	needs	to	re-define	itself.
Artworld, as interface
Self-reflection	in	art	became	more	common	by	the	middle	of	the	20th	century.	
Mirroring	the	existing	world	and	building	new	worlds	persisted	to	be	a	topic	
for	some	artists,	but	a	great	number	of	artistic	ventures	arose	with	the	goal	of	
delineating	the	artistic	world	and	asking	philosophical	questions	such	as	what	
is	 the	 true	nature	of	 the	arts	 (for	example	painting),20	or	when	 is	an	object	
a	 piece	of	 art.21	These	questions,	which	 are	 related	 to	 the	 artistic	 practice,	
suggested	 that	 art	 does	 not	 tackle	 the	 outside	world	 anymore,	 but	 is	more	
concerned	with	itself.	The	most	salient	conceptualizations	of	the	moment	of	
artistic	self-reflection	come	from	a	formalist	and	a	contextualist	direction.
Because	the	traditional	task	of	representation	was	apparently	more	aptly	ful-
filled	by	photography,	the	art,	especially	painting,	needed	to	clarify	the	basis	
of	its	own	existence.	If	photos	are	truly	better	reflections	than	paintings	then,	
most	probably,	paintings	are	not	 supposed	 to	be	 reflections	anymore,	 even	
if	their	existence	is	justifiable	at	that	point.	Impressionism	was	the	first	in	a	
series	of	“-isms”	that	were	determined	to	interpret	art	in	a	non-mirror	way.	
From	a	 theoretical	perspective,	 this	has	 led	 to	 the	rise	of	an	art-conception	
which	claimed	that	the	content	of	art-pieces	(the	reality	mirrored	by	art)	does	
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not	play	an	important	role	anymore	and	that	theme	or	content	in	art	lost	their	
relevancy,	while	formal	aspects	became	crucial.
Clive	Bell’s	1913	book,	plainly	titled	Art,	presented	the	formalist	approach	
in	a	very	clear	way.	Bell	asked	about	what	evokes	the	aesthetic	emotion	and	
came	to	the	conclusion	that	it	has	to	be	the	significant	form,	a	shared	charac-
teristic	of	all	visual	art-forms:
“…	in	each	(object),	lines	and	colours	combined	in	a	particular	way,	certain	forms	and	relations	
of	forms,	[that]	stir	our	aesthetic	emotions.”22
Bell	rejected	the	type	of	painting	he	calls	“descriptive	painting”:
“…	portraits	of	psychological	and	historical	value,	topographical	works,	pictures	that	tell	stories	
and	suggest	situations,	illustrations	of	all	sorts.”23
Actually,	he	is	talking	about	the	type	of	paintings	that	mirror	the	world.	Bell	
completely	distanced	himself	 from	 this	 type,	 stating	 that	“according	 to	my	
hypothesis	they	are	not	works	of	art”,24	thus	erasing	the	main	line	of	evolu-
tion,	beginning	from	the	dawn	of	the	Renaissance	until	the	second	half	of	the	
19th	 century.	He	 also	 called	 the	Renaissance	 “that	 strange,	 new	disease”.25	
He	believed	that	“with	 the	perfection	of	photographic	processes	and	of	 the	
cinematograph,	pictures	of	this	sort	are	becoming	otiose”.26
Clive	Bell’s	book	and	Roger	Fry’s	organizing	talents	played	a	defining	role	
in	 the	 introduction	and	propagation	of	post-impressionism	 (the	 term	 ‘post-
impressionism’	was	actually	coined	by	Fry).	They	claimed	 that	 the	 turning	
point	could	be	re-traced	to	the	art	of	Cézanne,	who	paid	close	attention	to	the	
importance	of	the	form.	Their	commitment	to	the	“significant	form”	did	not	
mean	the	total	rejection	of	representation.	They	did	not	think	that	representa-
tion	was	bad	in	itself	–	simply,	that	it	was	irrelevant.	Paintings	do	not	have	to	
be	compared	to	any	prior	model	to	help	us	determine	their	value:
“To	appreciate	fully	a	work	of	art	we	require	nothing	but	sensibility.”27
Clement	Greenberg	joined	this	line	of	thought	at	the	middle	of	the	century.	He	
also	played	an	important	role	in	establishing	the	monopoly	of	formalism	in	
the	post-war	America.	His	goal	was	to	construct	the	philosophical	basis	of	his	
own	formalist	vision.	In	his	work	modernist Painting	(1965)	Greenberg	held	
that	art	has	gone	through	a	shift,	similar	to	the	one	Kant	did	in	philosophy.	
As	Kant	used	the	means	of	philosophy	to	initiate	a	process	of	self-reflection	
and	drew	the	necessary	borders	of	philosophy,	art	was	going	through	a	similar	
change,	according	to	Greenberg.	Art	was	questioning	itself:	what	is	its	pur-
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pose,	what	is	proper	for	art,	what	is	that	je ne sais quoi	that	cannot	be	found	
in	any	other	discipline,	but
“…	that	which	was	unique	and	 irreducible	 in	each	particular	art.	Each	art	had	 to	determine,	
through	its	own	operations	and	works,	the	effects	exclusive	to	itself.”28
Thus	he	established	that	art	should	separate	itself	from	the	representation	of	
the	recognizable	things,	from	questions	of	the	perspective,	the	story	told,	or	
even	the	moral	lesson.	What	remained	was	flatness	as	the	particular	medium	
of	art.	In	this	metanarrative,	the	evolution	of	modern	painting	would	necessar-
ily	lead	to	the	rise	of	abstract	expressionism,	which	does	not	point	to	anything	
besides	Greenberg’s	formalist	expectations:
“…	visual	art	should	confine	itself	exclusively	to	what	is	given	in	visual	experience,	and	make	
no	reference	to	anything	given	in	any	other	order	of	experience.”29
Abstract	expressionism,	supported	by	Greenberg	himself,	ruled	the	US	artis-
tic	scene	for	two	decades.	If	you	wanted	to	become	an	artist,	you	could	not	
escape	being	an	abstract	expressionist.	This	streak	was	broken	in	the	sixties	
by	conceptualism	and	pop	art.	These	two	directions	affected	the	artworld	in	
ways	 beyond	 imaginable	 because	 they	 introduced	 entities	whose	 presence	
invoked	the	question:	but	is	it	art?	Duchamp’s	famous	piece,	the	Fountain,	
was	originally	a	urinal	purchased	in	a	store,	which	has	been	inverted	by	the	
artist,	 signed	and	named	“Fountain”.	We	might	ask	about	what	makes	 this	
object	a	work	of	art,	and	what	differentiates	this	piece	from	all	the	others	on	
the	shelves	of	the	store?	Or	why	is	Andy	Warhol’s	Brillo Box	a	work	of	art,	
while	all	the	others	in	the	supermarket	are	not?	Formalism,	which	claims	that	
the	essence	of	art	lies	in	the	form,	cannot	answer	these	questions:	two	objects	
from	 two	 completely	 different	 ontological	 classes	 barely	 differ	 in	 the	way	
they	look.	This	is	the	basis	for	Danto’s	“visually-indistinguishable-pairs	argu-
ment”:30	if	there	is	no	visible	difference	between	Duchamp’s	snow	shovel	and	
any	other	shovel,	but	the	former	is	a	work	of	art,	while	the	latter	is	not,	the	
difference	must	not	lie	in	the	perceptual	(formal)	properties.	Danto’s	sugges-
tion	is	that	what	makes	the	ordinary	object	into	a	work	of	art	(what	baptizes	
the	ordinary	object)	is	actually	the	artworld:
“To	see	something	as	art	requires	something	the	eye	cannot	decry	–	an	atmosphere	of	artistic	
theory,	a	knowledge	of	the	history	of	art:	an	artworld.”31
While	formalism	believes	that	the	historical	evolution	of	painting	will	come	
to	an	endpoint,	in	1984	Arthur	Danto	stated	that	this	type	of	art-perception,	
which	claims	that	there	is	a	linear	evolution	in	art,	will	end	and	that	“the	age	
of	pluralism	is	upon	us.”32	This	pluralism	is	made	possible	by	the	fact	 that	
by	the	sixties	the	experimentations	of	art	have	concluded	the	following:	the	
reason	why	something	is	art	depends	on	its	relation	to	the	artworld,	or	rather,	
whether	we	can	establish	such	a	relation.
The	real	progress	 in	 the	relation	of	art	and	the	world	is	not	only	that	art	 is	
more	concerned	with	itself	than	the	world,	but	that	art	is	actually	realized	by	
the	artworld	surrounding	it.	This	thought	is	most	prominent	when:
1)	 Relevant	objects	cannot	be	distinguished	from	their	non-art	counterparts.
2)	 Relevant	objects	were	not	conceived	to	become	works	of	art,	but	were	in-
troduced	into	the	world	of	art	when	they	were	“baptized”	by	the	artworld.
Both	apply	 to	 the	readymade	 introduced	by	Marcel	Duchamp.	The	 term	 is	
used	for	industrially	produced	objects	picked	out	(chosen)	by	the	artist	from	
a	line	of	identical	items.	In	becoming	a	readymade,	 they	lose	their	original	
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purpose	as	utility-items.	In	some	cases,	the	artist	makes	changes	on	the	ob-
ject	(like	in	the	case	of	Duchamp’s	1913	Bicycle Wheel)	and	in	some	cases	
he	does	not	(like	in	the	cases	of	the	Fountain	or	Egouttoir).	A	determining	
factor	is	the	naming:	the	name	of	the	snow	shovel,	In Advance of a Broken 
Arm,	might	seem	paradoxical,	since	the	object	is	a	real	shovel	hanging	on	the	
museum	walls.	The	shovel	will	never	be	used	for	shovelling	by	anyone,	so	
the	probability	of	someone	breaking	their	arm	from	the	effort	of	using	it	is	
quite	small.	Even	the	titles	which	at	first	glance	seem	descriptive	are	deceiv-
ing:	the	Bottlerack	apparently	names	the	object,	but	once	we	take	a	look	at	
its	French	name	–	Egouttoir – we	realize	that	it	contains	the	French	word	for	
taste:	le goût.	Thus,	for	the	once	naive	bystander,	it	might	seem	that	the	bottle	
dryer	is	actually	a	machine	with	the	(hidden)	role	to	evaporate	taste	itself:	a	
classic	concept	of	art,	one	which	Duchamp	rebelled	against	and	succeeded	
in	revolutionizing.	In	regard	to	 the	readymades,	we	can	surely	state	 that	 in	
absence	of	an	art	 theory,	based	on	the	 idea	of	baptizing	these	objects,	 they	
would	never	become	works	of	art	because	nothing	would	differentiate	them	
from	the	most	common	items.	The	artworld’s	interpretation	of	these	objects	
re-evaluates	them:
“…	as	a	transformative	procedure,	interpretation	is	something	like	baptism,	not	is	the	sense	of	
giving	a	name,	but	a	new	identity,	participation	in	the	community	of	the	elect.”33
They	can	only	become	readymade	art	through	their	relation	to	the	artworld.
The	situation	might	be	even	more	puzzling	in	the	case	of	outsider	art,	a	new	
trend	of	the	last	few	years	in	the	world	of	art.	At	the	2013	Venice	Biennale,	
Massimiliano	Gioni	curator’s	palette	of	exposed	pieces,	set	in	the	main	pavil-
ion	of	the	event	about	the	outsider	art,	was	impressive	and	surprising	at	the	
same	time.	There	were	paintings,	drawings	(like	Anna	Zemankova’s	pictures	
resembling	flowers,	or	Emma	Kunz’s	diagrams),	diary	entries,	board	draw-
ings	(like	Rudolf	Steiner’s	sketches	and	scribbles	made	during	his	lectures,	
which	were	preserved	on	black	paper),	and	collections	of	objects	(like	Bispo	
do	Rosario’s	objects	meant	for	salvation,	or	Morton	Bartlett’s	collection	of	
dolls,	or	insurance	agent	Peter	Fritz’s	collection	of	378	model	houses).	The	
term	‘outsider	art’	was	used	for	works	made	by	people	outside	of	the	artworld,	
without	any	artistic	education,	who	do	not	see	themselves	as	artists	and	do	not	
see	their	works	as	works	of	art.	Emma	Kunz	used	her	diagrams	in	her	healing	
séances	to	get	closer	to	her	patients,	Rudolf	Steiner	took	notes	on	the	black-
board	during	his	classes,	Bispo	do	Rosario	collected	 items	(from	pieces	of	
cloth	to	shoe	heels)	to	secure	their	survival	after	the	approaching	apocalypse,	
Morton	Bartlett	made	disturbing	dolls	for	his	own	enjoyment	and	later	boxed	
them,	so	the	dolls	were	found	only	after	his	death	by	an	art	dealer.	The	above	
mentioned	objects	were	not	conceived	as	household	items,	but	they	were	also	
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never	meant	to	fulfil	the	role	of	art	pieces.	Their	purpose	was	to	bear	some	
type	of	meaning,	but	 in	a	more	personal	and	less	artistic	way.	We	consider	
them	works	of	art	because	a	significant	agent	of	the	artworld	(art	dealer,	critic,	
curator	etc.)	picked	them	out	from	all	the	others	and	established	a	connection	
between	them	and	the	artworld.
It	is	because	of	this	relation	that	I	propose	that	they	should	be	referred	to	as	
institutional readymade:	a	representative	of	the	artworld	finds/chooses	these	
objects	(“object	trouvé”)	and	because	of	that	they	become	significant	parts	of	
the	art	arena.	In	the	case	of	the	institutional	readymade,	similarly	to	the	above	
mentioned	cases,	it	becomes	obvious	that	the	identification	of	these	items	as	
objects	of	art	is	realized	through	baptism	by	the	artworld.
The relation of art and the world
In	our	brief	review,	we	established	three	forms	of	the	relation	between	art	and	
the	world.	In	the	first	form,	art	was	a	reflection	of	the	world.	In	the	second	
form,	the	genius	created	a	new	world,	while	in	the	third	form,	that	fine	line	
between	art	and	everyday	life	gets	blurred	and	the	critical	distinction	between	
the	two	is	their	different	relation	to	the	artworld.
We	treated	art	as	a	distinct	area,	an	external	entity	in	opposition	to	the	world.	
But,	obviously,	art	is	a	part	of	life,	part	of	“the	world”	once	we	conceptualize	
“the	world”	as	the	totality	of	things.	But	inside	the	world	itself	art	has	its	own	
inner	world,	with	its	own	rules	and	firm	borders,	even	if	the	adventurous	artist	
will	never	stop	challenging	it.	The	world	of	art	is	so	self-propelling	that	art	
mostly	relates	to	the	world	through	the	artworld.
Gizela Horváth
Umjetnost, svijet, svijet umjetnosti
Sažetak
Grčki filozofi tvrdili su da je specifičan zadatak umjetnosti mimesis. Ova vrsta stava o odnosu 
između umjetnosti i svijeta bila je prevladavajuća do početka 19. stoljeća. Teorija genija u 
umjetnosti preispituje ovaj odnos te ne pretpostavlja da umjetnost treba oponašati svijet, nego 
očekuje originalnost: stvaranje novoga svijeta. Od početka 20. stoljeća svijet umjetnosti djeluje 
pod širim pojmom »umjetničkog djela«, primjerice Duchampov »readymade« i »institucionalni 
readymade« povezani s autsajderskom umjetnošću. U oba su slučaja stvaranje objekta i stva-
ranje umjetničkog djela odvojene djelatnosti koje izvode različiti pojedinci. Ovaj se rad nastoji 
uhvatiti u koštac s ovim proširenjima te dokazati da suvremena umjetnost nije primarno pove-
zana sa svijetom, nego u većini slučajeva sa svijetom umjetnosti. Stoga put od umjetnosti prema 
svijetu ide kroz svijet umjetnosti.
Ključne riječi
mimesis,	genij,	umjetničko	stvaranje,	readymade,	svijet	umjetnosti
Gizela Horváth
Kunst, Welt, Kunstwelt
Zussammenfassung
Antike griechische Philosophen behaupteten, die besondere Aufgabe der Kunst sei die Mimesis 
gewesen. Eine solche Betrachtungsweise der Beziehung zwischen Kunst und Welt dominierte bis 
zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts. Die Genie-Theorie in der Kunst überdachte diese Beziehung 
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und nahm nicht an, dass die Kunst die Welt nachahmen muss, vielmehr erwartete sie die Origi-
nalität: die Schaffung einer neuen Welt. Seit Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts figuriert die Kunstwelt 
unter dem breiteren Begriff des „Kunstwerks“, beispielsweise in Form von Duchamps „Rea-
dymade“ und „institutionellem Readymade“, die mit der Außenseiterkunst verbunden sind. 
In beiden Fällen sind die Schaffung eines Objekts und die Schaffung eines Kunstwerks zwei 
getrennte und von unterschiedlichen Personen ausgeführte Tätigkeiten. Das Paper versucht, 
diese Extensionen in Angriff zu nehmen und zu beweisen, dass sich die zeitgenössische Kunst 
an erster Stelle nicht auf die Welt bezieht, sondern vor allem auf die Kunstwelt. Daher führt der 
Weg von der Kunst bis zur Welt durch die Kunstwelt.
Schlüsselwörter
mimesis,	Genie,	künstlerisches	Schaffen,	Readymade,	Kunstwelt
Gizela Horváth
Art, monde, monde de l’art
Résumé
Les philosophes de la Grèce antique affirmaient que la principale tâche de l’art était la mi-
mesis. Cette manière de penser la relation entre l’art et le monde a été prédominante jusqu’au 
début du XIXe siècle. La théorie du génie a remis en question cette relation sans présupposer 
que l’art devait imiter le monde, mais au contraire, elle en a attendu une certaine originalité : 
la création d’un nouveau monde. Depuis le début du XXe siècle le monde de l’art se présente 
sous la notion plus large d’« oeuvre d’art », notamment dans la perspective du Ready-made de 
Duchamp liée à l’art brut. Dans les deux cas, la création de l’objet et la création de l’oeuvre 
d’art sont deux activités séparées réalisées par des individus distincts. Cet article tente de lutter 
contre certaines extrapolations et montre que l’art contemporain n’est pas d’abord relié au 
monde mais principalement au monde de l’art. Ainsi, le chemin qui passe de l’art au monde 
traverse le monde de l’art.
Mots-clés
mimesis,	génie,	création	artistique,	Ready-made,	monde	de	l’art
